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Key Points
· This article describes work of the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation’s Casey Strategic Consulting Group 
(CSCG), a 10-year, multistate initiative that em-
beds outside experts – both public-system and 
traditional management consulting –  in child and 
family services systems to improve system perfor-
mance and outcomes.
· The article describes five types of levers that were 
influenced in different combinations to promote 
change in different state systems. We call these 
“catalytic combinations.”
· In numerous states, including Maine, Louisiana, 
Virginia, and Indiana, the CSCG initiative produced 
measurable improvements in key performance 
areas, including shortening stays in foster care, 
improving rates of permanent placements for chil-
dren in foster care, reductions in foster-care recidi-
vism, and improving the percentages of children 
“aging out” of foster care who leave the system 
with a strong community/family connection.
· Different states have different strengths and chal-
lenges. What worked in one place won’t neces-
sarily work in another. The authors’ postulate, 
however, that by influencing “levers of change” in 
combination, one can drive broad improvement in 
how overall systems operate.
· Turning systems around is a long-range and dif-
ficult exercise, and one that is never complete. In-
fluencing catalytic combinations creates sufficient 
startup results for improvements to continue over 
time.
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In a state with a national reputation for being one 
of the best run in the country, it was an early and 
unpleasant eye-opener for newly elected Virginia 
Governor Tim Kaine: The commonwealth sported 
the worst record in the country when it came to 
children aging out of foster care absent any per-
manent connection to family or community. Said 
Kaine, who took office in 2006, 
When we saw the data we realized that what we 
knew anecdotally to be a problem was in fact persis-
tent and pervasive, that Virginia was a clear outlier, 
with fewer discharges from foster care to perma-
nency of any state. (Walters, 2010)
But while Kaine may have viewed Virginia as an 
outlier, the fact is that many states continue to 
struggle when it comes to moving children out of 
foster care and into permanent homes with fami-
lies. It is a simple reflection of a persistent prob-
lem: Public agencies assigned the difficult task of 
improving outcomes for vulnerable populations – 
poor children and families – have a mixed record. 
An extensive body of literature proposes various 
solutions for improving the performance of such 
agencies. Yet there has never been – nor is there 
ever likely to be – any silver bullet in this area. 
Complex systems, like complex families, have 
diverse strengths and needs, requiring thought-
ful, tailored assistance; and transforming them 
sometimes requires novel solutions. 
One emerging and promising approach to 
such system change is the concept of “catalytic 
mechanisms,” developed by management expert 
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Jim Collins (2001) and employed to remarkable 
effect in reforming Virginia’s child welfare system. 
Catalytic mechanisms are, according to Collins, 
“the crucial link between objectives and perfor-
mance.” They are “catalytic,” he argues, because 
they produce unexpected results, redistribute 
power, create positive and negative consequences, 
and have an ongoing effect. For example, Collins 
(1999) cites a gravel company’s new approach to 
customer satisfaction as a “catalytic mechanism”: 
giving customers the right to pay only for those 
services they deem satisfactory. Once adopted, 
Collins reports that this policy radically and per-
manently improved the company’s performance 
and profitability.
While these so-called catalytic mechanisms may 
sound simple (too simple, really), Collins points 
out that it takes strategic thinking to identify and 
leverage the catalytic mechanisms that lead to im-
proved performance. The change in billing policy 
was strategic because it was not the act alone that 
had so much impact, but rather its connection to 
other parts of the company’s system that made 
the difference. Clearly, the short-pay policy forces 
both learning and change.
It impels managers to relentlessly track down the 
root causes of problems in order to prevent repeated 
short payments. It signals to employees and custom-
ers alike that Granite Rock is dead serious about 
customer satisfaction that goes far beyond slogans. 
(Collins, 1999, p. 73) 
The question we consider in this article is whether 
the concept of catalytic mechanisms can be ap-
plied in the public sector – to child welfare in par-
ticular. Specifically, we want to see if it can help 
public agencies serve children more effectively 
and efficiently, and achieve well-defined objec-
tives. 
The approach described here was developed 
by the authors while working as employees and 
consultants with the Casey Strategic Consulting 
Group (CSCG) of the Annie E. Casey Founda-
tion.1 In 2001, the foundation created CSCG as an 
1 This work owes much to the experience and work of 
many CSCG members, including Karen Angelici, Ayanna 
Baker, Elisha Gilliam, Kathleen Feely, Tracey Feild, John 
in-house strategic consulting group to work with 
state and local government human-services agen-
cies engaged in system-reform efforts. The CSCG 
teams combined staff with traditional consulting 
experience with staff with nonprofit and public-
sector experience. The foundation invested in 
CSCG teams , which were assigned to state or city 
“clients,” as an alternative to traditional grantmak-
ing. Teams worked intensively at client sites on a 
weekly basis like private-sector consulting teams, 
in contrast to the more occasional technical as-
sistance help that was offered by the foundation.
The “catalytic combinations” approach evolved 
over a series of multi-year engagements with 
child welfare agencies around the country. Al-
though we focus on using catalytic mechanisms 
to change public child welfare systems, we believe 
that it has broad application for all client-oriented 
public agencies, including education, health, 
mental health, and juvenile justice. The difficulty 
of improving the results of public-sector agencies 
has been widely documented in both the profes-
sional and academic literature, spawning many 
Kim, Jacqueline Melton, Emily Prevas, Gretchen Test, and 
Tanya Washington. See Annie E. Casey Foundation work-
ing papers: Rightsizing Congregate Care: A Powerful First 
Step in Transforming Child Welfare Systems (2010); Fixing a 
Broken System: Transforming Maine’s Child Welfare System 
(2009); and Back on Track: Transforming Virginia’s Child 
Welfare System (2010).
The foundation invested in CSCG 
teams, which were assigned to state 
or city “clients,” as an alternative 
to traditional grantmaking. Teams 
worked intensively at client sites 
on a weekly basis like private-
sector consulting teams, in contrast 
to the more occasional technical 
assistance help that was offered by 
the foundation.
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approaches including David Osborn’s Reinventing 
Government (1993), Michael Barzelay’s Breaking 
Through Bureaucracy (1992), and Michel Barber’s 
Instructions to Deliver (2007). The approach we 
describe here is tailored for a client-serving public 
system that depends on frontline workers to 
achieve change.  
Public Child Welfare Systems 
Public child welfare agencies are charged with 
keeping children safe from abuse and neglect. 
Based on CSCG’s experience, we have found 
that such agencies tend to share a core set of 
problems, including a lack of significant family 
participation (especially by parents who have 
been accused of abuse or neglect); insufficient 
supply of community-based services, including an 
adequate number of high-quality foster homes; 
inadequate financial incentives regarding use 
of high-cost institutional placements over less 
expensive community-based services; and poli-
cies, practices, and organizational dynamics that 
frequently fail to keep pace with evidence-based 
interventions.
Crisis – child fatalities in particular – frequently 
drives change in public child welfare systems. 
Typically such crises lead to a political firestorm, 
but little actual system change. Based on CSCG 
engagements around the country, we discov-
ered that leaders respond to crisis in one of two 
ways: They either add a new process to already 
overly bureaucratic systems or they try to blame 
a specific person or policy, which often results 
in someone being fired or in some immediate 
yet symbolic policy changes.  Because both of 
these responses result in leaders making changes 
without first conducting a thorough analysis of 
a system’s strengths and shortcomings, the net 
result is that all too often nothing gets fundamen-
tally fixed. 
Further, we found that in large, complex govern-
ment agencies, working on numerous problems 
at once is not an effective strategy for push-
ing fundamental change, nor is trying to create 
reform by changing one policy or practice. When 
we focused on a specific problem, however, we 
discovered we could leverage that tight focus 
toward achieving systemwide improvement if the 
solution forced learning and change in other parts 
of the organization. The key was to focus on one 
strategic problem with a combination of actions, 
thus our term for the phenomenon: “catalytic 
combinations.”
That is the essence of the catalytic-mechanism 
design. The change in the gravel company’s cus-
tomer satisfaction policy, described by Collins, 
was catalytic because it focused on one funda-
mental company issue – improving customer 
satisfaction, which, when “solved,” caused a chain 
reaction in how staff dealt with customers, how 
managers dealt with problems, how staff got paid, 
and others. 
The question for CSCG was whether and how a 
change strategy that seemed to work well in the 
business world could be adapted to a large public 
system. 
New York City
The first opportunity to test and adapt Collins’ 
approach came in 2003, when New York City’s 
Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) 
approached CSCG for help on what would 
otherwise have been considered a narrow reform 
request: reducing the use of congregate or insti-
When we focused on a specific 
problem we discovered we could 
leverage that tight focus toward 
achieving systemwide improvement 
if the solution forced learning 
and change in other parts of the 
organization. The key was to focus 
on one strategic problem with a 
combination of actions, thus our 
term for the phenomenon: “catalytic 
combinations.”
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tutional placements for teenagers. Congregate 
care refers to 24-hour residential group facilities 
for children in state or local custody. Research 
indicates that the therapeutic value of congre-
gate care is suspect, especially as stays lengthen. 
Some studies, in fact, show outcomes to be worse. 
What’s more, congregate care placements can 
cost six to 10 times more than family-based place-
ments (Barth, 2002).
Despite years of successful permanency and pre-
vention efforts that reduced the New York City 
foster-care population by 27 percent from 1996 to 
2001 (Casey Strategic Consulting Group, 2003), 
the number of teens in congregate care rose five 
percent over the same time period. At the time, 
nearly two-thirds of the teens who entered care 
were placed in congregate care facilities. In 2003, 
ACS decided to ratchet up reform by focusing 
on reducing the number of teens in institutional 
placements. An additional incentive was a city 
budget reduction target that ACS vowed would 
be absorbed by savings related to reduced use of 
congregate care. 
Our first step in adapting Collins’ approach was 
to map out how potential changes to congregate 
care might cascade through a system. Every orga-
nization is made up of subsystems – that is, parts 
of the organization that interact and combine to 
create the overall system. Our experience led us 
to focus on five specific subsystems within the 
child welfare agency because these, in combina-
tion, had the potential to have the fundamental 
disruptive impact on a public organization that 
Collins describes: 
•	 Service array: The array of public and private 
programs, placements, and service options 
available for children and families. 
•	 Frontline practice: How caseworkers interact 
day to day with clients.
•	 Finance: What is and is not paid for, and how.
•	 Performance management: Regular use of out-
come measures and trends to make decisions 
and guide the agency.
•	 Policy: The official rules and regulations that 
underpin day-to-day practice of child welfare 
workers. 
Consequently, these subsystems became our 
“levers of change” that needed to be deployed in 
combination to affect fundamental change. 
A second step was translating Collins’ description 
of the effects of catalytic mechanisms to a public-
sector setting. Collins explains that activities are 
“catalytic” when they incorporate five distinct 
characteristics, which we applied and defined for 
the public sector (see Table 1).
The congregate care reduction effort in New York 
City focused on three levers of change: service 
array – decreasing the number of congregate beds 
available for placement; performance manage-
ment – using outcomes data to make funding 
decisions to eliminate group-home programs with 
the weakest outcomes; and new frontline practice, 
which emphasized talking with teens to identify 
potential family or “kinship” placement options 
instead of institutional placements.
Selecting the right combination of levers to 
achieve a catalytic effect is equal parts art and 
science. The “science” is identifying the right ac-
tions to disrupt the system in a way that improves 
results for children and family. The effect has to 
be measurable and needs to have a baseline and 
Every organization is made up of 
subsystems – that is, parts of the 
organization that interact and 
combine to create the overall system. 
Our experience led us to focus on 
five specific subsystems within the 
child welfare agency because these, 
in combination, had the potential 
to have the fundamental disruptive 
impact on an organization that 
Collins describes.
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a target goal. The “art” involves figuring out what 
is politically and organizationally feasible. In New 
York City, the agency already decided to reduce 
the number of congregate care beds, so it was nat-
ural to adopt the strategy of changing the service 
array. New York also had a tremendous amount of 
performance data on its providers (a rare occur-
rence in child welfare), so leveraging performance 
management fit naturally in the existing organiza-
tion. We also focused on frontline practice, not 
because it fit with what the city was already doing, 
but because addressing how placement deci-
sions were made for teens was a prerequisite for 
broader reform. The levers we chose played both 
to the strengths of the client and to the necessary 
prerequisites to change – including behaviors 
that had the power to stop reform if they were not 
addressed.
As CSCG expanded and adapted this approach 
beyond New York City, we learned that a criti-
cal part of every engagement was working with 
clients2 to determine which combination of 
levers was right for the particular context. While 
some sites, like New York City, elected to “close” 
2 We used a broad definition of “client” and gathered input 
from multiple stakeholders, including but not limited to 
different layers of staff, providers, families, and courts, in 
determining the best strategy.
residential beds more quickly, other sites followed 
what might be called an attrition strategy. 
As a beginning point in New York City, each con-
gregate care provider was evaluated on outcomes 
related to how quickly they moved children into 
either stable alternative placements or into per-
manent placements.3 This focus on performance 
was logical inasmuch as the goal to eliminate 600 
beds (out of approximately 4,400) was in part 
going to be achieved by shutting down poor per-
formers.4 To ensure that teens living in facilities 
targeted for closure were not simply transferred 
to other congregate care facilities, ACS worked 
with multiple stakeholders – including casework 
and supervisory staff, providers, families, legal 
advocates, and permanency experts – to design a 
case-review process that focused on finding fam-
ily placements for teens. Teams of social workers 
interviewed teens to explore permanency options 
based on existing adult connections, asking ques-
tions such as: “Whom do you trust? Who visits 
you? Who is listed on your cell phone speed-dial? 
Where do you go on holidays? With whom do you 
want to live?” ACS teams then contacted signifi-
3 New York City has some of the most detailed and exten-
sive data on provider performance in the country.
4 The permanent closure was critical to overcome a “this 
too shall pass” attitude of workers and providers.
Collins’ characteristics of 
catalytic mechanisms
Public-sector child welfare application
Produces desired results in 
unpredictable ways
Producing quick results in unpredictable ways meant producing quick results 
with no additional resources.
Distributes power for the 
benefit of the overall system
Redistributing power for child welfare involved changing who makes decisions 
about removal and placements. This meant shifting the decision from the 
agency alone to a group that included children and families, judges, guardians 
ad litem, private providers, and community members.
Has ‘sharp teeth’ 
(consequences)
Having ‘sharp teeth’ meant real consequences for system actors who are 
normally immune to the results they produce. Consequences might include 
new scrutiny for frontline workers or supervisors who do not justify particular 
actions or a reduced census for private providers who perform poorly on 
identified practice measures.
Ejects viruses Because removing workers and defunding institutions is neither easy nor 
quick, the public system had to focus on a positive version (‘injecting 
antibodies’) rather than ‘ejecting viruses’: promoting people who are 
champions of change and expanding programs that work.
Produces an ongoing effect Meant initial positive results for a pilot group of clients that is expanded to a 
larger population of children and families. It also meant structural changes and 
policies put in place to support continuing changes.
TABLE 1
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cant adults in teens’ lives to discuss permanency 
options along with any support services needed 
for such potential family placements. 
The initial pilot caseworker teams, which in-
cluded supervisors and managers, returned from 
visits to the congregate care facilities surprised 
by the number of potential individual placements 
that teens were able to identify; caseworkers did 
not expect to so quickly and easily move that 
many children out of institutions. Over the sum-
mer of 2003, 11 agencies in New York voluntarily 
closed 169 beds and transferred as many as 40 
percent of teens to family-based settings (Casey 
Strategic Consulting Group, 2003). Within a year, 
more than 600 beds had closed.
What was the system impact of the drive to 
reduce the use of congregate care – the disrup-
tion that led to positive change? First, it redis-
tributed power to children and families so they 
were involved in making decisions. Second, the 
surprising ease with which children were moved 
home helped begin debunking the belief that all 
congregate care placements were appropriate and 
necessary. Third, there were real financial conse-
quences – lost contracts – for lower-performing 
providers. When workers, supervisors, and 
managers saw all the changes, they began to re-
evaluate how congregate care was being used and 
get behind a new push for alternative placements.
While reducing both the number of children 
placed in congregate care and the time they spend 
outside of family settings is beneficial to children, 
other subsystems needed to change for the system 
to improve safety, permanency, and well-being. 
So, while the initial catalytic combinations started 
system reform, we found that follow-up was nec-
essary to achieve Collins’ fifth criteria: “produces 
an ongoing effect.” Employing catalytic combina-
tions upfront is merely the beginning of reform. 
In New York, the congregate care work was fol-
lowed by other changes. For example, ACS insti-
tuted a practice that immediately begins planning 
for adoption as a contingency while still attempt-
ing to reunify a child with birth parents. Policy 
was changed to require supervisory approval for 
placement in a congregate care facility. ACS also 
encouraged teens to consider open-adoption ar-
rangements that permitted contact with the birth 
family and greatly enhanced family involvement 
in case planning. Organizationally, ACS decided 
to dramatically change its case-management 
function on the heels of right-sizing’s success. The 
effort changed the largely administrative role of 
more than 400 case management workers to one 
of quality assurance. It took a catalytic approach 
to system reform through the congregate care 
reduction work to position the system for broader 
reform. 
ACS has achieved remarkable results over time in 
connection with its congregate care-bed strategy. 
The number of contracted congregate care beds 
decreased 47 percent, from 4,174 in 2002 to 2,192 
in December 2008, with no increase in re-entry 
rates (New York City ACS, 2009). Bed capacity 
stands at 1,440 today (New York City ACS, 2011). 
Concurrent with the reduction in bed capacity, 
ACS continues to reduce the percent of children 
spending time in residential care, outpacing the 
national decline. (See Figure 1.) 
When the congregate care reform work began in 
2003, two-thirds of teens were initially placed in 
congregate care, while one-third were placed in 
family settings. By 2006 the reverse was true, with 
two-thirds of teens initially placed with families. 
In addition, by 2009 New York City had rein-
vested more than $30 million of the money saved 
by moving more children in congregate care into 
foster-parent support and aftercare services.
While reducing both the number of 
children placed in congregate care 
and the time they spend outside 
of family settings is beneficial to 
children, other subsystems needed 
to change for the system to improve 
safety, permanency, and well-being.
Menashi, Behan, and Noonan
20 THE FoundationReview 2012 Vol 4:1
Embedding Catalytic Combinations in 
Public-Sector Systems
Since 2003, we have employed our congregate 
care reduction approach in multiple sites. The 
complementing actions – the catalytic combina-
tions – CSCG might recommend in any given 
case were not predetermined, however, as indi-
cated by the range of activities (see Table 2). In 
fact, the art of system reform includes taking into 
account the contingent and unique nature of each 
child welfare agency’s subsystems along with the 
specific challenges those agencies face. It takes 
experience – along with a keen eye and ear and 
the willingness to work directly with those on the 
frontlines of service delivery – to scope out which 
subsystems need to adapt in order to produce 
broad, enduring change. But CSCG found that 
with practice, experience, and the ability to be on 
the ground for a significant amount of time, one 
fundamental catalytic combination can, in fact, 
yield relatively speedy and meaningful results that 
help drive and actually embed change in complex 
and historically change-averse systems. As our 
work evolved, we identified a series of what we 
call “embedding steps” that helped clients put into 
place the additional changes needed to solidify 
the reform effort. 
Understanding the effective sequencing of 
catalytic combinations became an important 
factor for CSCG teams. For example, in order for 
congregate care reduction to have an ongoing 
impact, the system needed to build capacity to 
replace congregate care beds with family-based 
placements. To do this, practice around recruit-
ing and retaining foster parents needed to change. 
We concluded that starting the reform effort 
with foster-family recruitment could not produce 
catalytic change. Creating bed capacity in foster 
families did not have sufficient leverage to shift 
the system away from overreliance on congregate 
care. However, after enacting the initial cata-
lytic combination focused on congregate care 
(by focusing on a new policy and performance 
management, for example) the system was then 
positioned to accommodate other reforms, such 
as improving foster-parent recruitment.
Maine
In 2004, more than 27 percent of the children in 
Maine’s foster-care system were in congregate 
placement – far above the national average of 17 
percent (Casey Strategic Consulting Group 2004). 
The system had a strong bias against placing chil-
dren with relatives and frequently placed children 
far from their home communities, even out of 
state. Working together, CSCG and Maine’s Office 
of Children and Family Services (OCFS) proposed 
removing 10 percent of children from congregate 
care – 70 children in all – and transferring them 
to permanent, home-based placements. To ac-
complish this, CSCG and OCFS looked at three 
FIGURE 1  Residential Care in NYC vs. National AFCARS Data
Source: NYC Flash Data 2011, National AFCARS Data
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levers of change that they believed, done in com-
bination, would support the initiative to reduce 
congregate care. 
The selection of levers in Maine followed the 
strategic process used in New York City. First and 
foremost, the combination of levers had to create 
the disruptive consequences described by Collins. 
Second, we discovered that what was politically 
and organizationally feasible in New York City 
was not so in Maine, hence the “art” of selection. 
Maine leadership had no interest in closing beds 
right away, and the system did not have perfor-
mance data on the providers. Accordingly, initial 
changes focused on new policies that made it 
more difficult for a caseworker to place and keep 
Subsystems Initial Catalytic Steps Embedding Catalytic Steps
Service array •	 Help providers switch from 
residential care to community-
based services.
•	 Discourage creation of 
congregate placements.
•	 Use targeted recruitment to increase community 
foster homes. 
•	 Re-allocate funding to community-based services 
from congregate care. 
•	 Use flexible funding to make more kin eligible as 
caregivers.  
•	 Provide financial and technical assistance to 
providers who want to change their service mix.
Frontline 
practice
•	 Talk to young people about 
their placement preferences.
•	 High-level staff participate in 
meetings with children and 
families.
•	 Model success in a visible 
jurisdiction.
•	 Increase engagement of parents and family 
through Team Decision Making or Family Team 
Meetings.    
•	 Highlight successful home-based placements for 
unlikely children through regular communication.
•	 Build leadership and frontline support for reform 
by involving a range of staff members in designing 
reforms. 
•	 Redesign training program to focus on 
strengthening families.
Finance •	 Alter financial incentives for 
congregate care. 
•	 Use flexible funding to create 
more community services. 
•	 Redirect savings from decreased use of 
congregate care to community-based services.
•	 Create flexible funding for customized support.
•	 Finance the change process for private providers 
who want to shift practice.
•	 Provide financial support for kin placements.
Performance 
management
•	 Use performance measures 
to evaluate congregate-care 
providers.
•	 Use consistent measures to 
evaluate agency leadership.
•	 Provide assistance to leaders 
struggling to meet new 
targets.
•	 Phase out contracts with poorly performing 
providers.
•	 Promote staff who support using less institutional 
care.
•	 Encourage staff who object to goals to leave the 
agency.
•	 Use performance data as a tool to manage staff 
(regional managers, supervisors, case workers) 
throughout the system.
Policy and 
regulation
•	 Require prior authorization for 
placement in congregate care.
•	 Require utilization reviews for 
continued stays in congregate 
care.
•	 Limit use of independent living 
as a case goal.
•	 Prohibit the placement of 
children under age 12 in 
congregate facilities.
•	 Mandate search for potential kinship homes .
•	 Mandate family-based concurrent planning for all 
children.
•	 Encourage youth to consider open adoption 
arrangements that permit birth-family contact.
TABLE 2
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children in a congregate facility. OCFS worked to 
revise key policies, instituting prior authorization 
and utilization review for all ongoing institu-
tional placements, which produced surprising 
results – showing how easily children were safely 
and effectively moved from congregate care. The 
agency director also made a priority the creation 
of a performance-tracking system that allowed 
him to monitor the success of the regions and his 
regional directors regarding the new policy. In 
fact, the OCFS director took it upon himself to 
personally monitor the congregate care census 
each week, and each district director knew that 
he or she would have to explain his or her perfor-
mance at monthly staff meetings. Peer pressure 
and natural competition then encouraged and 
emboldened regional leaders to join the effort to 
reduce the number of children in congregate care. 
Leaders who did not support the new approach 
were eventually removed. Finally, we also selected 
practice change for the same reason we selected 
it in New York City – if it did not change, nothing 
else would matter. Initially, “permanency teams” 
were designed and staffed to work with children 
and families to brainstorm ways to move children 
out of institutional settings. This change redistrib-
uted power from the caseworker alone to a team 
that included children and families, when possible 
and appropriate.5
As with New York City, the results achieved in 
Maine were substantial and came with remark-
able speed. After six months there was an eight 
5 For more information, see Fixing a Broken System: Trans-
forming Maine’s Child Welfare System, the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation (2010). http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Topics/Child%20Welfare%20Permanence/Other/ 
FixingaBrokenSystemTransformingMainesChildWel/
AECF_FixingABrokenSystemFinal_Final.pdf
percent reduction in children in congregate care, 
and in two years a 46 percent reduction – 350 
children. In July 2011, five percent of children in 
Maine’s custody were in institutional settings, 
making Maine one of the top performers nation-
ally in limiting the use of congregate care. 
Also parallel to the New York City experience, the 
catalytic combination of policy, practice, and per-
formance-management changes associated with 
congregate care reform led to other systemwide 
changes. Most notably, Maine initially shifted $4 
million from congregate care placements to fam-
ily “wraparound” and community-based service.6 
The state continues to invest in developing an 
array of community-based services, instituting 
evidence-based programs such as Multisystemic 
Therapy and Multidimensional-Treatment Foster 
Care. 
Virginia
According to Collins, “catalytic mechanisms 
force the right things to happen even when those 
in power have a vested interest allowing point-
less, expensive practices stay in place” (Collins, 
1999, p. 75). In Virginia, CSCG, working with 
the newly- elected Gov. Tim Kaine, again used 
a fundamental push on congregate care reduc-
tion to drive a catalytic change involving two 
key levers. First, the group decided to work on 
congregate care finance in a locally administered 
child welfare system7 by adjusting how much the 
state reimbursed localities for the shared cost of 
foster-care placements. Second, the effort focused 
on frontline practice, piloting a new approach to 
foster-care placements in the city of Richmond. 
This “top-down/bottom-up” approach was critical 
in Virginia because children and family services 
are locally administered with state oversight, so it 
was essential that both state and local officials be 
engaged in the reform effort. 
6 Maine Office and Children & Family Services. Maine 
Residential Provider Rate Report: Move Children to Less 
Restrictive Care, Maine Office of the Budget 2004-2005.
7 In nine states, including Virginia, child welfare systems 
are administered locally with state oversight. In these 
states, counties receive some of their funding from the 
state, but typically must match federal and state funds with 
some portion of local funds.
We discovered that what was 
politically and organizationally 
feasible in New York City was not 
so in Maine, hence the “art” of 
selection. 
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As part of a strategy to reduce congregate care, 
CSCG recommended that the state start paying 
a lower match rate to localities for congregate 
care placements and a higher match rate for 
community-based services provided on behalf 
of children remaining in their own homes. The 
governor’s office agreed that financing was clearly 
a powerful subsystem driving local government 
behavior, and so focused efforts on winning leg-
islative support for the change in reimbursement 
rates. Under the new funding formula, cities and 
counties would be required to pay more to place 
children in institutional settings. This finan-
cial disincentive had immediate and significant 
financial consequences for local governments and 
providers, as fully one-third of children statewide 
and half of the children in Richmond were in 
some congregate care setting at the time of the 
initiative.
At the same time, CSCG and the Virginia team 
sought to address frontline practice through a 
pilot in Richmond aimed at both reducing the 
number of congregate- care placements and 
improving family engagement by helping institute 
“Team Decision Making” (TDM),8 whereby 
any interested stakeholders – family, teachers, 
neighbors, friends, probation officers, clergy, 
coaches – would come together and discuss pos-
sible placement and treatment options for a child. 
This teaming model offered the child and family 
a forum in which to speak up for their needs, 
and took the onus for placement decisions off 
the shoulders of a single caseworker. As a result, 
workers were much more inclined to consider 
alternatives to institutional placements.9
In Richmond, CSCG began with a pilot of 25 of 
the 282 children in institutional care. These 25 
were 17-year-olds and on the verge of “aging out” 
of the system. Workers met with each teen to 
discuss moving from a group home to a fam-
8 Team Decision Making is a teaming strategy originated 
by Family to Family, an Annie E. Casey Foundation initia-
tive, for making child welfare placement decisions.
9 Virginia created the Council on Reform (CORE) to draw 
local support and buy-in by including local leaders in the 
change process. Without this capacity building throughout 
the system that supported the reform ideals, it is unlikely 
that the results in Richmond would have taken root in 
other counties.
ily. Within weeks, half of the teens were able to 
move to a family setting and another 15 percent 
had a plan to move to a family setting within 60 
days. Within two years of the start of the initia-
tive, Richmond reduced the number of children 
in foster care from 548 to 388 and the number of 
children in congregate care from 282 to 71 (Vir-
ginia Department of Social Services, 2011).
This catalytic combination approach produced 
three of the five characteristics of catalytic 
change outlined by Collins: It produced desired 
results in an unpredictable way by getting so 
many children out of care in Richmond so easily, 
it redistributed power to the families and the 
community-based providers, and it had “sharp 
teeth” in that the financial implications of place-
ments had an immediate and significant impact 
on local governments and providers. 
Embedding Change in Maine and Virginia 
After the initial congregate care reductions in 
Maine, agency leaders instituted deeper changes. 
They reoriented their mission and practice to-
ward permanency for children. They have also ex-
panded their performance-management system 
to include outcome measures for supervisors and 
caseworkers. Training has completely changed to 
reflect the updated mission and values. Provid-
ers, meanwhile, were offered incentives to change 
their services to reflect the new vision of child 
welfare, and many adapted to the new goals. Of 
Maine’s $10.4 million in original budget savings, 
$4 million was reinvested in wraparound services. 
The Maine General Assembly approved a perma-
The original congregate care 
catalytic-combination strategy, 
along with subsequent reforms, has 
had a profound effect: The number 
of children in out-of-home care has 
gone from 3,054 when reform started 
to 1,467  in August 2011.
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nent line item in the budget to continue the fund-
ing, given continued congregate care savings. The 
original congregate care catalytic-combination 
strategy, along with subsequent reforms, has had 
a profound effect: The number of children in out-
of-home care has gone from 3,054 when reform 
started in 2004 to 1,467 in August 2011 (Maine 
Department of Health and Human Services, 
2011). The decrease in the number of children in 
congregate care has been dramatic, and Maine’s 
reduction in the percentage of children in con-
gregate care has far outpaced the national decline 
(see Figure 2). Finally, the practice changes have 
lead to a sustained increase in children staying 
with relatives (see Figure 3). Maine’s child welfare 
reform is held up as an example for creating more 
effectiveness and efficiency in state government 
that other agencies should emulate. In The Times 
Record, the president of Maine Children’s Alli-
ance and the child welfare agency ombudsmen 
wrote: 
The good news … is that fewer children enter state 
custody, more remain secure in their communities, 
and costs to the state are greatly reduced. … [M]ore 
effective care at less cost is exactly what we hope will 
take place elsewhere in state government.” (Maine 
Center for Economic Policy, 2011)
System reform is picking up steam in Virginia 
through additional steps to produce improve-
ment beyond right-sizing congregate care. 
Virginia continues to push reform based on five 
principles the state adopted earlier in its trans-
formation effort: managing by data; engaging 
families by a family-engagement teaming process 
before any child’s entry into foster care; investing 
in resource family recruitment, development, and 
support; creating a continuum of community-
based services; and establishing regionalized, 
competency-based training across Virginia.
In combination, these subsystem changes have 
produced dramatic results: Far fewer children 
are in foster care, and those who exit care are less 
likely to re-enter the system (see Figure 4). Place-
ments in group care have dropped dramatically 
– from 25 percent to 15 percent – reflecting the 
shift in resources from group care to community 
based care (see Figure 5). Virginia started reform 
FIGURE 3  Maine Has Sustained and Improved Results Over Time
Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Children and Family Services, Monthly Management Report, July 2011.
**National AFCARS data, change from 2003 to 2009 for caseload data and 2004 to 2009 for congregate care data.
FIGURE 2  Maine Has Sustained and Improved Results Over Time
Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Children and Family Services, Monthly Management Report, July 2011.
**National AFCARS data, change from 2003 to 2009 for caseload data and 2004 to 2009 for congregate care data.
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ranked 50th nationwide in exits to permanence, 
between 2007 and 2010 exits to permanence 
increased from 64 percent to 73 percent (Vir-
ginia Department of Social Services, 2011a). And 
perhaps most impressively, Virginia did this by 
decreasing spending by six percent per year after 
years of relentless cost increases (see Figure 6), 
saving the state more than $100 million compared 
to projected costs (Virginia Department of Social 
Services, 2011b). 
Conclusion
All of the child welfare systems described in this 
article worked to expand their congregate care 
reform as a way to influence the whole system and 
to improve results for safety, permanence, and 
well-being for children. Getting children out of 
congregate care and into a safe, nurturing family 
setting is a positive step in and of itself. Simulta-
neously, as part of a catalytic combination, reduc-
ing reliance on congregate care disrupted systems 
and pushed them toward broader reform. In New 
Source: February Critical Outcomes Report, Virginia Child Welfare Outcomes Report CFSAR data, Virginia Child Welfare Report 
Services System Transformation Outcomes Report.
FIGURE 4  In Virginia, Far Fewer Children Are in Foster Care, and Those Who Exit Care Are Less Likely to Reenter the System
Sources: Virginia Office of Comprehensive Services, Statewide Statistical Data.
http://www.csa.virginia.gov/publicstats/index.cfm, downloaded 9/26/11. Expenditures for 2001-2010:
Locality reports of CSA Medicaid Billings and CSA Pool expenditures; extrapolation of 2001-2008 trend by Annie E Casey Foundation. 
Spending on congregate care & community-based spending 2007-2010: CSA Data Set statewide reports.
FIGURE 5  Virginia Is Meeting More Children's Needs in Community-Based Care, Rather than Congregate Care
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York City, Maine, and Virginia, child welfare 
leaders were able to use congregate care reduc-
tion (along with additional levers) to promote 
and embed changes in programs, policies, and 
procedures – and to improve the lives of children 
and families. As the field continues struggling 
with how to improve outcomes for children and 
families, we suggest that all public-sector systems 
look for interventions that are catalytic in nature. 
Given the extreme budget cuts that child welfare 
agencies have seen and will continue to see in the 
foreseeable future, figuring out how to provide 
better services with fewer resources is critical. 
Based on our experience in moving complicated 
and calcified child- and family-services systems in 
a better direction, we believe that catalytic combi-
nations are worthy of further support, experimen-
tation, and study.
Philanthropists are in an ideal position to experi-
ment with the right catalytic combinations in 
other policy areas, whether as specific as reducing 
homelessness or as sweeping as improving educa-
tion systems. While the authors believe the con-
cept is applicable in other human-services areas, 
the specific levers of change will be developed 
only by trial and error. Mark Kramer, in his article 
Catalytic Philanthropy, describes a new form of 
assistance for social change where foundations 
“have the ambition to change the world and the 
courage to accept responsibility for achieving the 
results they seek”; he asserts that foundations can 
do this by “creating the conditions for collabora-
tion and innovation” (2009, p. 32). The CSCG 
model suggests that public-sector agencies need 
support in identifying and staging the combina-
tion of changes that will produce ongoing change. 
The catalytic-combinations approach we describe, 
and the role of the foundation in making the 
change operational, presents a model for moving 
toward catalytic philanthropy and social change. 
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